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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Andrzej Porwisz (“Petitioner”) admittedly overstayed his nonimmigrant 
visa, and in September of 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated 
removal proceedings against him.  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ultimately granted 
Petitioner’s request for voluntary departure and alternatively ordered his removal if he 
did not comply with the terms of the grant of voluntary departure.  Petitioner appealed the 
voluntary departure order.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed his 
appeal, and he petitioned for review by this court.  Petitioner contends that the BIA erred 
in failing to address his arguments regarding section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), which provides, in pertinent 
part, that “[a]ny alien . . . who . . . has been unlawfully present in the United States for 
one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such 
alien’s departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.”  Petitioner argues 
that that he is not subject to this provision and that the DHS’s interpretation of this 
provision as barring his readmission for 10 years is incorrect.  We conclude that 
Porwisz’s petition for review is moot and is not ripe for review, and we will dismiss the 
petition for review.1 
I. 
 Petitioner is a native of Poland who entered the United States on approximately 
August 24, 2002, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa, which authorized him to remain in the 
                                              
1 The BIA had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) 




United States for a temporary period of time not to extend beyond February 23, 2003.  
Petitioner did not depart in February 2003.  
 On October 11, 2007, Edison Machine LLP filed an application for a permanent 
employment certification on Petitioner’s behalf, and the U.S. Department of Labor 
approved this application on December 3, 2007.  On approximately April 29, 2008, 
Edison Machine LLP also filed an I-140 immigrant petition for an alien worker, which 
was approved on December 11, 2008.    
 In January, 2010, Petitioner filed an I-485 application for adjustment of status 
pursuant to section 245(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), with the DHS.  The DHS 
denied this application because his documents in support of that application did not 
demonstrate “that [he] maintained lawful nonimmigrant status beginning on February 23, 
2003 and ending on January 6, 2010.”  A.R. at 112-13.  Thereafter, on September 10, 
2010, the DHS commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner pursuant to section 
237(a)(1)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).   
 Petitioner, with the representation of an attorney, appeared before an IJ three times 
between November 30, 2010, and February 14, 2013.  During these hearings, Petitioner 
conceded removability and sought voluntary departure.  However, Petitioner also 
renewed his application for adjustment of status despite his recognition that he was not 
eligible for such adjustment.  Petitioner openly admitted that the purpose of this 
application was to create an appealable issue so that he could challenge at the appellate 
level the DHS’s interpretation of the “unlawful presence” bar in 
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) as applying to those departing pursuant to voluntary 
departure orders.2  Petitioner did not request the IJ to address his arguments regarding the 
inapplicability of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) to voluntary departure orders in the first instance.  
During the final hearing on February 14, 2013, the IJ issued an oral ruling granting the 
application for voluntary departure, giving Petitioner until April 15, 2013 to depart and 
imposing an alternative removal order to Poland (in the event that Petitioner did not 
comply with the voluntary departure order).  The IJ did not address the adjustment of 
status issue any further, aside from marking that application as “withdrawn” on the order 
sheet.  The IJ noted that Petitioner reserved an appeal.   
 On March 7, 2013, Petitioner filed his appeal to the BIA.  In his appeal, Petitioner 
did not address the adjustment of status issue and instead challenged DHS’s interpretation 
of the “unlawful presence” bar of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  The BIA dismissed the appeal 
on October 6, 2014.  The BIA reasoned that while the IJ “did not fully address 
[Petitioner’s] renewed application for adjustment,” the BIA had “no reason to reverse 
[the IJ’s] decision or remand for further proceedings, since [Petitioner] does not appear to 
challenge the DHS’ denial of his application for adjustment on appeal.”  A.R. at 3.  As to 
Petitioner’s arguments concerning § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), the BIA stated that it “need not 
address [these] arguments concerning admissibility with respect to any future application 
for re-admission, as the issue is not properly before us.”  Id.  However, the BIA noted 
                                              
2  Petitioner sought review of an issue relating to voluntary departure, but voluntary 
departure orders are not appealable.  Thus, to pursue his appeal, Petitioner sought to use 
the denial of his adjustment of status application as a vehicle for appealing the voluntary 
departure readmission issue.   
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that it had previously stated in Matter of Arrabally, 25 I & N Dec. 771, 774 (BIA 2012), 
that the inadmissibility provisions of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) applied to aliens who depart 
under a grant of voluntary departure.  For these reasons, the BIA dismissed the appeal.  
Petitioner filed a timely petition for review. 
II. 
 We must consider whether we can address Petitioner’s arguments regarding 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) despite his failure to leave the United States in compliance 
with his voluntary departure order.  The BIA warned Petitioner that pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.26(i), a grant of voluntary departure terminates upon an alien’s filing of a petition 
for review before departing the United States.3  The United States Attorney General 
(“Respondent”), argues that the issues raised in the instant petition for review, which 
consider the effects of a voluntary departure order, are moot because Petitioner’s filing of 
a petition for review while remaining in the United States terminated his voluntary 
departure order.  Respondent states, “because Petitioner no longer has the option of 
                                              
3 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i) provides:  
Effect of filing a petition for review. If, prior to departing the United States, 
the alien files a petition for review pursuant to section 242 of the Act (8 
U.S.C. 1252) or any other judicial challenge to the administratively final 
order, any grant of voluntary departure shall terminate automatically upon 
the filing of the petition or other judicial challenge and the alternate order 
of removal entered pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section shall 
immediately take effect, except that an alien granted the privilege of 
voluntary departure under 8 C.F.R. 1240.26(c) will not be deemed to have 
departed under an order of removal if the alien departs the United States no 
later than 30 days following the filing of a petition for review, provides to 
DHS such evidence of his or her departure as the ICE Field Office Director 
may require, and provides evidence DHS deems sufficient that he or she 




leaving the United States in accordance with the terms of his voluntary departure order, 
he has no personal stake in this Court’s resolution of th[is] issue.”  Respondent’s Br. at 
12-13.  Respondent further contends that the BIA properly declined to consider the issue 
raised in the petition regarding the applicability of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) because the 
issue was not properly before it and the BIA’s policy is to avoid issuing advisory 
opinions.  See BIA Practice Manual § 1.4(d)(iii), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-immigration-appeals-2. 
 Petitioner responds that the BIA should not have declined to address his arguments 
based on his failure to leave the country and apply for readmission because, had he done 
so, the issue would not have been reviewable as a result of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 and the 
doctrine of consular nonreviewability.  See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 
(1972) (stating that where Congress has delegated the exercise of its power to make rules 
for the exclusion of aliens to the Executive, and “the Executive exercises this power 
negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] 
look behind the exercise of that discretion”).  Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4: 
Departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of 
deportation or removal proceedings . . . subsequent to the taking of an 
appeal, but prior to a decision thereon, shall constitute a withdrawal of the 
appeal, and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the same extent 
as though no appeal had been taken. 
 
Thus, if Petitioner left the United States in compliance with his voluntary departure order, 
his appeal would be deemed withdrawn.  Petitioner argues that we should consider his 
petition for review despite the fact that his petition appears to be moot and not ripe for 
review, based on the procedural difficulties described above. 
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 If the issues in a case “have become moot, i.e., are no longer ‘live,’ the case will 
be moot and therefore nonjusticiable.”  Pennsylvania v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 681 F.3d 
503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012).  The case or controversy requirement of Article III of the 
Constitution requires “‘(1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal 
controversy that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual 
predicate for a reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently 
adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.’”  Id. at 506-07 (quoting 
In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 The Supreme Court has instructed that the “basic rationale [of the ripeness 
doctrine] is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.”  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 148 (1967).  We must consider the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”  Id. at 149.  A court making a 
“fitness for review” determination must “consider[] whether the issues presented are 
purely legal, and the degree to which the challenged action is final.  A court must 
consider whether the claims involve uncertain and contingent events that may not occur 
as anticipated or may not occur at all.”  Comite’ De Apoyo A Los Trabajadores Agricolas 
v. Perez, 774 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 We agree with Respondent that, because of the operation of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), 
the issue of whether § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) applies to voluntary departure orders is moot 
as to Petitioner.  We also agree with the BIA’s determination that this issue was not 
properly before it.  The Petitioner did not voluntarily depart and apply for readmission, so 
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therefore, the issue is not ripe for us to consider whether the ten-year bar for readmission 
under § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) applies to aliens that voluntarily depart from the United 
States.  Accordingly, we must dismiss Petitioner’s petition for review.4 
III. 
 For these foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review. 
 
                                              
4 We fully understand the procedural difficulties that an alien that voluntarily departs and 
wishes to challenge the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) will face, but in 
order for this court to exercise jurisdiction there must be a live controversy that is ripe for 
review.  No such controversy is present in this case. 
